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 In this paper, I argue that the most salient aspect of narrative is not the 
 arrangement of speech elements into a particular order but the kinds of 
 actions that can be accomplished with narratives. Narrative is best thought 
 of as a verb, “to narrate,” or the derived form, “narrating.” It is an 
 expressive action, something that persons do. I argue that one of the 
 primary functions of narrating is to “make present” life experience and 
 interpretations of life in a particular time and space. Narrating brings 
 experience and interpretations into play, into a field of action, in a specific 
 here and now.  
 
 
At the current moment, there is tremendous cross-disciplinary 
interest in the narrative concept. Narrative is a hot topic. It seems to be 
everywhere. This is a positive development. I am convinced that some 
concept of narrative is critical to understanding the experience and 
interpretation of life.  
But what is “narrative” exactly? Pinning down the concept of 
narrative is problematic. I find myself coming back again and again to 
the same questions: What is narrative? And what is narrative 
psychology? Certainly, these are difficult questions. Narrative is an 
elusive concept, and narrative psychology is equally elusive. Perhaps 
this is because the term, “narrative,” is so widespread that the sense of 
the word has become stretched and overextended. Its meaning is 
diffuse.  
In his conceptual history of narrative, Hyvärinen (2010) 
observes that there are at least four separate narrative turns: in literary 
theory, historiography, the social sciences, and culture at large. Each 
of these narrative turns has its own history and distinct understanding 
of the concept. In the social sciences, the conceptual development of 
narrative proceeded on its own path. Rather than appropriating the 
terms delineated in literary theory or linguistics or coming up with a 
concrete definition of narrative itself, psychology, like the other social 
sciences, appears to be content with an imprecise metaphor.  
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Narrative stands in for something else. It is a convenient 
placeholder, an empty vessel, configured for the purposes of each user 
who can define the term in any way that he or she likes. As Hyvärinen 
(2006) argues, in the social sciences, the something else is, often, life; 
narrative is a powerful metaphor for understanding life.  
Hyvärinen’s (2006) point is convincing. Personally, I see my 
own work as contributing to the narrative turn in the social sciences. 
My understanding of narrative does tend to be metaphorical. Narrative 
does stand in for something else. Also, I am inclined to agree with 
Hyvärinen’s (2006) observation that the something else is life. How 
do persons make sense of life? How do they portray life in words? 
What are the consequences of these representations?  
An interesting implication of Hyvärinen’s thesis is, if narrative 
is a metaphor, then, why narrative and not something else? Couldn’t 
another metaphor work equally well? I am not going to argue against 
the concept of narrative. The narrative metaphor is not, necessarily, 
incorrect or misleading. I believe that the narrative metaphor is 
essential for understanding psychological processes and social reality, 
but it needs some precision.  
The theoretical framework that I describe attempts to ground 
the metaphor so that narrative can be applied productively to describe 
life experience in more complex and accurate terms. On the one hand, 
the narrative metaphor should be sufficiently open to include a broad 
range of research and dissent. But, on the other hand, it should be 
specific enough such that we know what narrative is and why we are 
doing narrative, and it should direct us to innovative ways of 
understanding human lives.  
As I see it, the concept of narrative should focus on how 
narrative works to create meanings. I take this to be the principal 
mission of narrative, basic to what makes it such an attractive concept. 
Narrative allows researchers insight into the process of meaning 
making.  
 
From Narrative to Narrating 
 
But how does it do this? How can narrative be envisioned, 
such that it allows researchers to describe meaning making in 
language that is both rich and concrete? These are the critical 
questions.  
In the social sciences, and in other narrative turns, there is a 
tendency to understand narrative as a structural concept. After all, the 
earliest narrative turns were in folklore (e.g. Propp, 1928/1968), 
literature (e.g., Barthes, 1966/1975), and linguistics (e.g., Labov & 
Waletzsky, 1967/1997), where narrative is often conceived as having 
basic underlying structural characteristics. The proposed structures 
vary between disciplines and theorists.  
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Recent scholarship in literary studies moves beyond simplistic 
notions of narrative structure. Poststructural narratologists have 
argued that either/or categorizations of narrative are problematic. 
Herman (2009) argues that the lines between narrative and other 
forms of speech events, such as explanation and description, are 
permeable. Although the prototypical cases seem clear, there is a large 
middle ground of mixed forms, “narrative explanations,” and 
“descriptive narrations.” Differences are subtle, of degree rather than 
kind (Herman, 2009). Similarly, Ryan (2007) argues for a fuzzy-set 
definition of narrative that comprises multiple dimensions, including 
spatial, temporal, mental, formal, and pragmatic. The fuzzy-set 
excludes some forms of discourse as non-narrative, such as repetitive 
events or instructions. But the definition becomes very open, a “tool 
kit for do-it-yourself definitions” (p. 30), in which narratologists can 
choose to emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of narratives.  
Even if scholars could articulate a way of marking narrative 
forms of speech from other forms of speech, I would be skeptical of 
the significance of such a discovery. To psychologists and others, who 
are interested in narrative because of the way that narratives are 
involved in how persons make sense of life, the issue of form is 
secondary. The arrangement of speech elements into a structure is not 
the innermost property of narrative.  
In order to focus on meanings, I advocate what could be 
thought of as a functional approach to narrative. This is not because I 
think the structural, formal, or organizational properties of narratives 
are insignificant. It must be emphasized that they are very important 
and complementary, but secondary. Later in the article, I try to flesh 
out some aspects of how structure and function work together. 
However, for now, I want to argue that the structural 
components of narratives are not what make narrative special and 
ubiquitous. Rather, I believe that narrative is interesting because of the 
meanings that we are able to express and articulate through narrating. 
How does narrating work or function to communicate and reveal 
aspects of human experience (Fludernik, 1996) and manage 
meanings? In other words, narrative is important because of what can 
be done or accomplished with narrative.  
A functionalist account of narrative asks: how does narrative 
work to accomplish meaning making? In asking this question, I 
conceptualize narrative as a dynamic process (Schiff, 2006). Narrative 
can be thought of as a verb, “to narrate” or “narrating,” rather than the 
noun form “narrative.” To narrate calls forth the conceptual 
similarities with the related forms “to tell,” “to show,” and “to make 
present.” Narrating discloses experience. Importantly, we move from 
understanding narrative as a static entity and begin to view it, more 
accurately, as a process. Narrative is a doing, a happening, an 
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eruption. Or, as I like to think about narrating, it is an expressive 
action, unfolding in space and time.  
Such a move does end up including a wide range of 
expressions in the category of narrative that others would exclude or 
overlook. Indeed, I would include a wide variety of expressions, 
verbal but also non-verbal, that make present life experiences and 
interpretations of life as appropriately narrative.  
This is where the notion of narrative functions fits in. Function 
directly addresses the meaning of narrating. What do narratives do? 
What can be done or accomplished with narrating? How does 
narrating work? How does narrative work through and express 
meaning? How is meaning negotiated by persons in the social world? 
In a specific time and place? What is the language game that we call 
narrating (Rudrum, 2005)?  
 
Narrating as Making Present 
 
In what follows, I outline this thesis that narration has various 
meaning-creating functions that can be described in concrete terms. 
But I am not going to make the claim that I have all the terms right. I 
am not going to provide a taxonomy of narrative functions to end up 
as a pithy chart. My description is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, 
the categories are beginning points, which should serve as ways of 
thinking about narrating to be refined and rethought in narrative 
research. I hope to provide some tools to describe, in detail, exactly 
how narratives work as sense-making practices. The power of 
thinking about narrative functions is to allow for creative ways of 
describing and researching meaning making.  
Despite this caveat, I begin my account with the assertion that 
a basic function appears to underlie many, if not all, varieties of 
narrative. As I see it, the foundational property of narrating is to 
“make present.” This is narrating’s primary function.  
The idea of “making present” is inspired by phenomenological 
and hermeneutic philosophy, particularly Heidegger and Ricoeur, but 
also the work of Mark Freeman (1993, 2010). Although I retain some 
of the meanings emanating from this tradition, I extend the idea of 
making present to new domains.  
The notion that narrative functions to make present has many 
nuanced consequences for what narrative means and how it works to 
express and make sense of life. I now turn to a description of three 
related ways of conceptualizing making present and a discussion of 
some of the implications of these ideas. I argue that making present 
has at least three related aspects that can be put together to view 
narration as a whole. Making present is: 1) Declarative: Making 
present gives presence to subjective experience; 2) Temporal: Making 
present gives meaning to the past, present and future; and 3) Spatial 
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(social): Making present co-creates shared and divergent 
understandings of the world.  
 
Making Present as Showing 
 
First and foremost, making present can be thought of as a 
variety of showing. Telling makes known. It is declarative. It 
establishes: I am this; I know this; I have seen or experienced these 
events; these are my thoughts or reflections; this is what I imagined or 
dreamt. Even, this is what I have been told by my friend.  
In narrating, we establish the subjective facts of our life 
experience. We communicate the feel and texture of our lives. For me, 
this is how it is or was. When we tell, we make experience and 
interpretations of life present in a social scene of action, using the 
terms of some particular linguistic, historical and cultural community.  
Presence has the sense of taking shape, of giving corporality: 
“to give presence to.” Narrating puts knowledge into play in the real 
world. Experiences, feelings, inchoate thoughts take form. They gain 
substance. They become something other than internal wanderings but 
become active as they are entered into the here and now of the social 
world.  
There is a certain sense in which telling objectifies our 
subjective experience and projects it into the world of social life. The 
words live on past their internal value, beyond the closed-off space of 
the un-told. In such a way, narrations can be considered by the self 
and by others. They can be taken as an object and analyzed. They are 
en-textualized in speech or action and can be commented upon, 
returned to in conversation and taken to other contexts. 
Certainly, an important aspect of narrating is telling experience 
in order to make known what we have lived through. Memoirs and 
autobiographies are often primarily interested in making life 
experiences known. This is especially true in cases of hardship and 
injustice. For example, the publication of journals and stories from the 
trenches in World War I is voluminous. But even more exceptional 
are the stories of concentration and death camp survivors after World 
War II, who provided written and oral testimony of their experiences. 
In the language of Holocaust studies, witnesses make present their 
memories through their testimony. Making present is a claim to truth, 
of holding on to the reality of the past. This is one of the nuances of 
the idea. In making present, speakers are making claims about the 
reality of their experiences or knowledge. Part of the object of making 
present is to clear a space, to make an argument for, the narrator’s 
understanding of reality.  
Of course, cynical performances are always possible. The 
relationship between telling and experience is complex. Narrating 
makes present but this presence is always in the context of an absence. 
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There is always a gap between what we know and experience and 
what we tell (Josselson, 2004). The gap consists of the inability of 
words to truly capture and represent events and perhaps sentiments 
and our inability to speak or write as fast as we think and feel. But 
also, narrating is restrained by the relevance of our thoughts to the 
current conversation, their tellability in this context (Ochs & Capps, 
2001). Power dynamics constrain or limit the ability to speak 
(Johnstone, 1996). Unconscious desires, conflicts, or traumas may edit 
internal processes. People lie or willingly conceal. When we give 
voice to an idea, the expression is not a direct representation of 
experience itself.  
Despite the disjuncture between experience and telling, 
narrating is closely tied to lived experience and our reflections on life. 
Narrating is, arguably, the closest that we can get to experience and 
our understanding of experience. There is no denying the fact that 
narrations are constructions but they are constructions which articulate 
aspects of our lived experience and they become active forces in the 
field of social life.  
Narrative works in presence. And it must. What can be said 
about absence, except it is not there? Most of the time, there is not a 
lot more to add. Still, we need to recognize and attend to the limits of 
narrating and what it can reveal about human experience.  
 
The Fusion of Narratings in Time and Space 
 
Narrating is always making present at some specific time and 
place. In a very real sense, experience is made present here and now, 
in the context of a particular conversation, real or imagined, that is 
taking place at a certain time. Considering the idea of making present 
in relation to time and space adds additional nuances to this function.  
It will be helpful to describe making present in time and space 
separately. But in a sense, they always go together to form a complete 
context. Bakhtin (1981) coined the term chronotope to describe the 
fusion between time and space evidenced in literary narratives. But 
the idea is equally applicable to other varieties of telling.  
Young’s (2004) analysis of oral narratives makes this point 
explicit. Beginning from Goffman’s analysis of frames, Young argues 
that there are two frames that surround stories about the past. The 
widest frame, Young calls the realm of conversation. Indeed, 
storytelling is part of everyday language in use. It is found within 
dialogues, which have echoes of other previous conversations and 
projections to future scenarios. The conversation that we are in right 
now is part of a long chain of conversations and only meaningful 
because it stands in reference to them. Smaller than the realm of the 
conversation is the storyrealm, which Young defines as “tellings, 
writings and performances—that is, of recountings of or alludings to 
                                                         NARRATIVE WORKS 2(1)           39  
events understood to transpire in another realm” (p. 77). The 
storyrealm is the here and now in which tellers use language in order 
to conjure another world. The taleworld is this other realm. It is the 
world of characters and actions that we take to have transpired in 
another space and time.  
Although my definition of narrative is somewhat different than 
Young’s, her analysis evokes the embeddedness (Georgakopoulou, 
2007) of where telling happens. Taleworlds are made present in a 
specific time/space horizon. They are made present here/now or 
there/then—in a definite chronotope. We can begin to imagine and 
concretely describe the when and where of narrating, when and where 
narrators make a world present.  
In terms of temporality, making present means literally 
bringing experience and evaluation into the present, in present time. In 
terms of spatiality, making present means building shared tellings and 
understandings of self, other, and world.  
 
Making Present in Time 
 
The relationship between narrative and time is a central 
concern in narrative study. Some researchers argue that narrative is 
the vehicle for bringing together the present, past, and future into a 
coherent whole (McAdams, 1996).  
Freeman (2010) argues that one of the proper functions of 
narrative is reflecting on and making sense of the past. For Freeman, 
understanding is always from the perspective of the present, looking 
backward, what he calls hindsight. Reflection provides the space for 
creating new and meaningful understandings of the past. Hindsight is 
a kind of “recuperative disclosure” (p. 44). He writes that hindsight 
and poetry can be “agent[s] of insight and rescue, recollection and 
recovery, serving to counteract the forces of oblivion” (p. 44). He 
continues, a little later, “Or, to put the matter more philosophically, it 
is a making-present of the world in its absence; it is thus seen to 
provide a kind of ‘supplement’ to ordinary experience, serving to 
draw out features of the world that would otherwise go unnoticed” (p. 
54; emphasis added). Telling the past, putting it into words, is a way 
of recovering aspects of our past from forgetfulness.  
What we recall from the past, and when we recall it, 
reconfigures the meaning of the past. The past is reflected upon in 
new ways, through subsequent life experiences and the present. The 
past is rewritten by how things have turned out since, how our life is 
now, who we are now.  
Time is never just clock time but it is also human time. The 
now of the clock corresponds to a point in my lifetime and the 
lifetimes of others who are co-present with me. Making that past 
present in this now, we tell a developmental story in which we look 
40           SCHIFF: THE FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE 
over once again those past experiences and give them new laminations 
of sense and significance. But we always do this from the present. 
Time moves forwards and backwards; clock time keeps on moving 
forward, but retrospective time moves backward (Mishler, 2006).  
Ricoeur (1980) compares the act of re-collection to the act of 
reading a book that we have already read before. Drawing upon 
Kermode, Ricoeur argues that we can only know the meaning of a 
story or novel when we know the ending. But in life, we already know 
the ending, or at least, our current understanding of how events have 
turned out until the present now. In such a way, interpreting our life 
from the present becomes an act of “reading the past backward” 
(Schiff & Cohler, 2001). The past is always colored by our knowledge 
of the present and becomes something new in the act. As our lives 
develop, so too do we develop new reworkings of the meaning of the 
past. The past is never just the past but, as Cohler (1982) argues, it is 
always “a presently understood past.”  
 
Making Present in (Social) Space 
 
The past that we make present and the timing of when we 
make it present rewrites the meaning of our lives, our identities. 
However, we are just looking at one part of the chronotope. As I have 
argued, narrating makes present in time and space. We need to 
consider both in order to form a complete context. In every “now,” 
there is a “here.”  
In order to understand the “here,” it is critical to highlight that 
space is highly socialized. Other people are the most salient aspect of 
where we make present our life experience. We are “here” with 
others, both real and imagined.  
This is one of the profound implications of Bakhtin’s 
dialogical theory. All speech is part of an ongoing dialogue and 
addressed to others (Bakhtin, 1981; Noy, 2002), from whom we 
expect a response. Our words seek out an answer and are only really 
comprehensible in light of the response from others (Gergen, 2009). 
Narrating is a social activity that is grounded in the actual context in 
which it occurs and it has very clear and concrete social meanings.  
Making present in space implies locating ourselves in a given 
conversation. The imagery is one of being physically present in an 
ongoing “scene of talk” (Herman, 2009), a social performance 
(Bauman, 1986) in which we enter into and exit from conversational 
turns (Sacks, Schlegoff, & Jefferson, 1974). We gain our “footing” in 
the conversation at hand (Goffman, 1981). We “position” ourselves in 
relation to what is being said, to the others present, and to larger 
identity discourses (Bamberg, 2004; Davies & Harré, 1990; 
Georgakopoulou, 2007; Wortham, 2000).  
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There is strong evidence that the ability to tell stories is first 
acquired through the child’s participation in storytelling activities with 
others who are more expert (Fivush & Nelson, 2006). Miller (Miller, 
Fung, & Mintz, 1996; Wiley, Rose, Burger, & Miller, 1998) observed 
that children as young as two years old participate in telling stories of 
their personal past, but always with the help of a more experienced 
teller. This is what she terms co-narratives. Indeed, these are 
narratives that could not be told except with the mother’s help. No 
scaffolding, no narrative.  
Of course, conversations are not only mine. They are not 
invented from whole cloth in the present. The words and stories that 
we possess are social, inherited from our predecessors by virtue of our 
participation in a world rich with sense and meaning. From the very 
beginning, we find ourselves immersed in this world. We are born, in 
medias res, in the midst of ongoing conversations that precede our 
own personal existence. Through participation in this world and in 
concert with others, we discover the language and stories of life. 
These conversations are concrete and face-to-face. Through repeated 
interaction with others, we come to know the stories of our 
community, what a story is, and how to tell such stories. The stories 
are enacted, made alive, for us in a certain time and space.  
Through the enactment of stories, we learn about the basic 
facts of our existence: what a self is, the roles and desires of others, 
how the world works, the meaning and goals of life. These stories are 
resources for understanding who we are and the meaning of our 
existence. As MacIntyre (1981) put the matter, “deprive children of 
stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their 
actions and their words” (p. 216).  
Although such co-narrations are, theoretically, a stage in the 
child’s ability to independently tell stories about his or her past, co-
narrations are much more prominent than is recognized. There are 
some sound theoretical and empirical reasons to argue that all 
narrations, even in adulthood, are co-narrations. 
Georgakopoulou (2007) argues that narrative psychology 
privileges narratives in which there is a single speaker who tells a 
significant life experience to an interested and attentive listener. 
According to Georgakopoulou, the problem with this model is that 
everyday narrative practices are strikingly different, involving 
multiple competing speakers who negotiate basic issues of story 
ownership and evaluation. Meaning emerges from the interaction in 
which multiple persons make present life experience, together, 
regardless of whose experience it was/is/will be. Speakers take up 
roles or positions in storytelling to produce a negotiated account. 
Narrating is a co-narrating, a kind of “co-action” (Gergen, 2009), even 
in the research interview (Mishler, 1986). It involves balance, 
mutuality, and negotiation between participants.  
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The end result is to make present together joint understandings 
of self, others, the world, the past that are mutually shared between the 
participants. But this is not the only result. Narrating also gives form 
to divisions and disagreements in these understandings, making 
visible aspects of power, status, and authority (Georgakopoulou, 2007; 
Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner & Cain, 1998). Co-telling doesn’t lead 
necessarily to consensus—far from it. It can also be a vehicle for 
bringing forward and expressing competing versions of reality that 




I want to return to the opposition that I constructed between 
structure and function. I have argued that narrative inquiry should be 
concerned with the process and use of narrative. Although structure 
should not be thought about as an end in itself, how narratives are 
formed and told can be critical insights for describing and 
understanding questions about the meanings of narrating. In other 
words, structures have functions. In the following, I want to make a 
couple of brief comments about the relationship between structure and 
function. Certainly, there is more to be said. 
First, structure appears to have a link with the length and 
complexity of narratives. I have argued that showing or making 
present experience is essential to narrating and of substantial value in 
understanding life experience. Making present includes intricate and 
detailed narratings, such as life stories or autobiographies, and shorter 
interventions into everyday conversations. At the level of more basic 
narrations, many elements of narrative convention are not as 
prominent or, perhaps, necessary. Mediation, artfulness, and structure 
are still evident, but such articulations of experience have more in 
common with the structure of speech turns in conversations.  
But, once we consider more complex tellings, with multiple 
actions and characters across time and space, the artfulness of forming 
a narrative takes on increased salience. To deal with complexity of the 
kind that life relentlessly presents us, narrative conventions provide 
the tools for managing and expressing the thickness and density of our 
experience. As Brockmeier (2012) has argued, narrative is the form of 
discourse best suited to capturing the complex activities of human 
action. “No other sign system could handle and communicate the 
complexity of these syntheses in such a comprehensive, economic, 
and effective manner” (p. 443). Narrative structure is helpful in 
dealing with the messiness of human experience in order to infer the 
meaning of actions, motivations, cause and effect, connections. Such 
conventions become more evident and necessary as complexity 
increases.  
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Second, expressions that are structured using particular 
conventions, such as those resembling a Labovian personal experience 
narrative, might possess properties such as repeatability, which in turn 
have consequences for understanding ourselves. Although stories are 
responsive to the situation of telling and the audience, substantial 
portions of narrative structure and content are repeated across tellings 
(Chafe, 1998; Norrick, 1998; Schiff, Skillingstead, Archibald, Arasim, 
& Peterson, 2006). In other words, people might not tell exactly the 
same story twice, but central elements of stories are carried to new 
contexts and over time. Similarly, borrowed, vicarious narratives, 
from face-to-face conversations and from the media, are routinely 
integrated into telling of our personal experiences. Putting words into 
a structure may help us to remember and use the story in diverse 
contexts. The longevity of particular stories, and particular aspects of 
our lives, might be enhanced by our ability to articulate those 
experiences in a conventionalized and transportable structure. 
 A third way that structures serve functions is in the ability to 
create and experience other worlds. Herman (2002, 2009) argues that 
one of the basic elements of narrative is the capacity to create 
imagined fictional and non-fictional worlds, or storyworlds. There is 
something seductive about good storytelling; good stories transport 
readers/listeners to another place and time. This ability to shift from 
the here and now and into another storyworld relies upon the 
listener’s, or reader’s, desire and interpretive skills, but also on 
linguistic, structural, aspects of the narrative itself. Narratives, literary 
and oral, often provide indicators for readers to shift their focal point 
of consciousness to the storyworld (Herman, 2002).  
 
Then…is Everything Narrative? 
 
A functionalist approach to narrative does include a wide 
range of verbal and non-verbal practices that would be disregarded in 
current research. In some ways, the range of possible narrative 
scholarship does become larger, but it also closes off other avenues. In 
any case, a functionalist perspective does not imply a radical opening 
of the narrative concept.  
First, one should view the functionalist position against the 
backdrop of what is currently practised. The current use of the 
narrative concept is woefully imprecise. “Narrative research” appears 
to have no meaning outside of the researcher’s desire to frame his or 
her study as “narrative.” At the current moment, everything is 
narrative.  
In contrast to current practice, functionalism gives shape and 
grounding to narrative. It does so in a way that is inclusive, 
welcoming creative ways of approaching meaning making. Using this 
definition, researchers can recognize narrating by attending to what an 
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expressive act accomplishes, and know the reasons why they are 
studying narrating, to understand the hows and whys of meaning 
making.  
Still, distinguishing between what is narrating and what is not 
narrating on the basis of function will continue to be tricky because it 
relies on interpretive criteria. Do these words function to express and 
make sense of life experience? A given application can be disputed. 
But I don’t see this as particularly problematic. All distinctions break 
apart under critical scrutiny. A good definition stimulates innovation. 
Functionalism serves as a guide for research and thinking by orienting 
us toward what narrating can do and inspiring creative research on 
meaning making.  
Still, not everything becomes narrative. But it does mean that 
the more we stop and pay attention to expressive acts, the more we 
can start to see them as narratings. Still, typing loudly on my 
computer is not, usually, a narrating. But given the right context, it 
can be. Stepping on the brakes of my car is not, usually, a narrating. 
But, once again, it depends on the context. A verbal greeting, “hello,” 
buying bread at the bakery, ordering a steak at a restaurant, or many of 
the habitual expressions that we make present in our day to day lives 
are not, usually, narratings. But they can be.  
In my estimation, the answer to whether or not something is 
narrative moves from a focus on the text in isolation to the way the 
text is understood. Whether or not something is narrative depends on 
whether or not we understand it narratively. The burden is as much on 
how the expressive action is constructed and produced as on how it is 




I have argued that the primary function of narrating is making 
present. Narrating is an expressive act in which life experiences and 
understandings of life are articulated and made meaningful through 
their declaration in our present circumstances and in collaboration 
with co-actors. Making present is not the only function of narrating. 
To give just a few other possibilities: narrative functions to establish 
close bonds, to organize past events, to give color and pathos to our 
lives, to attribute cause and agency to our experiences, to establish 
social identity, and even to lie and conceal. But I would argue that all 
of these functions are related to, perhaps even require, making present 
at their core.  
What are the implications of this theoretical analysis for 
narrative research? Where does it suggest that narrative research 
should go? I firmly believe that narrative scholars should focus on the 
process of meaning-making—on what narrative does and how it 
accomplishes this—in the concrete circumstances in which meaning-
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making happens. How do persons, in time and space, make sense of 
life experience?  
In my opinion, this is what narrative research is all about. This 
is the unique contribution that narrative research can make to the 
advancement of psychology and the social sciences at large. Narrative 
allow us to take an inside path to understanding how persons connect 
together aspects of their life and world. Quantitative methods using 
statistical analysis can’t study how persons construct a world, think 
about themselves, and connect themselves to their social world. This 
is what narrative does best. And I believe that it can do so in a way 
that valorizes the complex experience of persons while holding true to 
the kind of systematic observation required by science.  
Although my description has been theoretical, narrative should 
not be. Further work on narrative functions should be grounded in 
actual observations of interviews and other conversations. Once again, 
the goal is not a taxonomy but to use the idea to think through the 
problem of how meaning is accomplished in time and space, turning 
toward the concrete circumstances in which life experience is made 




Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: Four essays (M. Holquist, Ed.; C. 
Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Bamberg, M. (2004). Form and functions of “slut bashing” in male identity 
constructions in 15-year-olds. Human Development, 47(6), 331-353. 
Barthes, R. (1975). Introduction to the structural analysis of narrative. New Literary 
History, 6(2), 237-272. (Original work published 1966.) 
Bauman, R. (1986). Story, performance, and event: Contextual studies of oral 
narrative. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Brockmeier, J. (2012). Narrative scenarios: Toward a culturally thick notion of 
narrative. In Jaan Valsiner (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of culture and 
psychology (pp. 439-467). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Chafe, W. (1998). Things we can learn from repeated tellings of the same 
experience. Narrative Inquiry, 8, 269- 285. 
Cohler, B. J. (1982). Personal narrative and life course. In P. Baltes, & O.G. Brim 
(Eds.), Life-span development and behavior: Vol. 4 (pp. 205–241). New 
York, NY: Academic Press.  
Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves.  
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20(1), 43-63. 
Fivush, R. & Nelson, K. (2006). Parent-child reminiscing locates the self in the past. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 24, 235–251. 
Fludernik, M. (1996). Towards a “natural” narratology. London, UK: Routledge. 
Freeman, M. (1993). Rewriting the self: History, memory, narrative. London, UK: 
Routledge.  
Freeman, M. (2010). Hindsight: The promise and peril of looking backward. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Georgakopoulou, A. (2007). Small stories, interaction and identities: Studies in 
Narrative 8. Amsterdam, NL: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.  
46           SCHIFF: THE FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE 
Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Herman, D. (2002). Story logic: Problems and possibilities of narrative. Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press. 
Herman, D. (2009). Basic elements of narrative. Chichester, UK: Wiley 
Blackwell.  
Holland, D., Lachicotte, W., Jr., Skinner, D., & Cain, C. (1998). Identity and 
agency in cultural worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hyvärinen, M. (2006). Towards a conceptual history of narrative. In M. 
Hyvärinen, A. Korhonen, & J. Mykkänen (Eds.), The travelling concept 
of narrative. Retrieved from: http://www.helsinki.fi/collegium/e-
series/volumes/volume_1/001_04_hyvarinen.pdf  
Hyvärinen, M. (2010). Revisiting the narrative turns. Life Writing, 7(1), 69-82. 
Johnstone, B. (1996). The linguistic individual: Self-expression in language and 
linguistics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Josselson, R. (2004). The hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Narrative Inquiry, 14(1), 1-28. 
Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. (1997). Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal 
experience. Journal of Narrative & Life History, 7(1-4), 3-38. (Original 
work published 1967.) 
MacIntyre, A. C. (1981). After virtue: A study in moral theory. Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (1996). Personality, modernity and the storied self: A 
contemporary framework for studying persons. Psychological Inquiry, 
7(4) 295-321.  
Miller, P. J., Fung, H., & Mintz, J. (1996). Self-construction through narrative 
practices: A Chinese and American comparison of early socialization. 
Ethos, 24(2), 237-280.  
Mishler, E. G. (1986). Research interviewing: Context and narrative. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Mishler, E. G. (2006). Narrative and identity: The double arrow of time. In A. De 
Fina, D. Schiffrin, & M. Bamberg (Eds.), Discourse and identity (pp. 30-
47). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Norrick, N. R. (1998). Retelling stories in spontaneous conversation. Discourse 
Processes, 25(1), 75-97. 
Noy, C. (2002). “You must go trek there”: The persuasive genre of narration among 
Israeli backpackers. Narrative Inquiry, 12(2), 261-290.  
Ochs, E. & Capps, L. (2001). Living narrative: Creating lives in everyday 
storytelling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Propp, V. (1968). Morphology of the folktale (2nd Ed.). Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press. (Original work published 1928.) 
Ricoeur, P. (1980). Narrative time. Critical Inquiry, 7(1), 169-190. 
Rudrum, D. (2005). From narrative representation to narrative use: Towards the 
limits of definition. Narrative, 13(2), 195–204.  
Ryan, M.-L. (2007). Toward a definition of narrative. In D. Herman (Ed.), The 
Cambridge companion to narrative (pp. 22-35). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the 
organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50(4) 696-735. 
Schiff, B. (2006). The promise (and challenge) of an innovative narrative 
psychology. Narrative Inquiry, 16(1), 19-27. 
Schiff, B. & Cohler, B. (2001). Telling survival backward: Holocaust survivors 
narrate the past. In G. M. Kenyon, P. G. Clark, & B. de Vries (Eds.), 
Narrative gerontology: Theory, research and practice (pp. 113-136). New 
York, NY: Springer.  
                                                         NARRATIVE WORKS 2(1)           47  
Schiff, B., Skillingstead, H., Archibald, O., Arasim, A., & Peterson, J. (2006). 
Consistency and change in the repeated narratives of Holocaust survivors. 
Narrative Inquiry, 16(2), 349-377. 
Wiley, A. R., Rose, A. J., Burger, L. K., & Miller, P. J. (1998). Constructing 
autonomous selves through narrative practices: A comparative study of 
working-class and middle-class families. Child Development, 69(3), 833-
847.  
Wortham, S. (2000). Interactional positioning and narrative self-construction. 
Narrative Inquiry, 10(1), 157-184. 
Young, K. (2004). Frame and boundary in the phenomenology of narrative. In M.-L. 
Ryan (Ed.), Narrative across media: The languages of storytelling (pp. 76-
107). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.  
 
 
 Brian Schiff, PhD, is Associate Professor and Chair of the Psychology 
 Department at The American University of Paris. Schiff received an  AB 
 in Psychology from the University of Michigan and a PhD in  Psychology: 
 Human Development from The University of Chicago. He was a Lady 
 Davis Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a 
 Mellon Fellow at Wellesley College. Schiff's research uses life story 
 interviews in order to study the social and cultural dynamics of identity 
 formation. He is also interested in culture and human development, the 
 individual's connection to collective memory, and the theoretical 
 development of narrative psychology. 
